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“Only that man who governs
himself may govern others”:
Jan Amos Comenius and his
Anthropological Assumptions
of Moral Politics

by Jan Hábl
Introduction: “Consider the state of
public affairs”
We need “men of virtue” in public affairs (cf.
Komenský 1992, 226). We need them in all areas of our lives, no doubt, but I want to focus on
politics in this paper. Ever since the time of Plato,
Aristotle and Augustine, the demand for morally
fit people in politics has been foundational in every
Jan Hábl, Ph.D., is a lecturer on moral education, ethics,
anthropology, and pedagogy at Jan Evangelista Purkyně
University, Ústí nad Labem, Czech Republic, as well as an
evangelical pastor.
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polis. Unfortunately, there has always been a shortage of such people. The question is, why? Where
does this inconsistency come from? Why does the
phrase “moral politician” so often sound as a humorous oxymoron? Is it even possible to practice
moral politics? Jan Amos Comenius2 believed it
is. But his theory presupposed a specific notion
of humanity. The aim of this paper is to outline
Comenius’ (Komensky’s) anthropology3 and to
highlight its possible implications for politics that
would stand up to the attribute “moral.”
“Consider the state of public affairs”: Comenius thus begins his famous analysis of the political situation of his time, which from the first glance
amazes the reader with its relevancy to today (compare Panegersia, V: 28)4. For Comenius, it is obvious
that the task of every “ruler, emperor, king, prince
or superior”5 is primarily an effort to bring about
the “blissful state of private and public affairs” and
the “happiness of the nation,” as well as a “moral
world.” To do this, he must have a “richness of virtue, steadfastness, honesty and wisdom” (Mundus
moralis, V: 9). However it is obvious that only one
who first governs (controls) himself, and does that
“even if nobody is watching,” can govern another
(compare Mundus moralis, III: 2, iv). And of course
it’s here that the problem begins.
Instead of wisdom and virtue, Comenius must

acknowledge the plethora of “ugly and unworthy
excesses,” which we as human beings “allow in politics.” According to Comenius, “wolves, bears, tigers,
snakes and other wild animals live with other members of their kind in unison… . But we, the rational
creatures, ... behave worse than animals; either we
continually push ourselves to governance, or on the

In order to best convey
the lostness of the human
position, Comenius introduces
this particular notion of
“samosvojnost” (self-originatingand-sustaining).
contrary we avoid all government and thus present
everywhere the attitudes that lead to disorder, and
entangle ourselves in endless trouble” (Panegersia,
V: 28-34).
It seems that since the time of Comenius not
much has changed in public affairs. The moral “deficit,” which current Western society feels, calls for
a “massive demand” for “virtuous people.”6 Moral
issues are coming from the margins to the forefront
at all levels of social life.7 And the feverish discussion doesn’t arise from a mere whim but from ethical concerns about the “habitability of the planet,”
which for the first time in history has been put at
risk by its own citizens.8 G. Lipovetsky even warns
that “the twenty-first century will be either ethical
or it won’t be at all.”9 It seems that the time is ripe
for a discussion about rectifying human affairs. So
what is Comenius’ advice?
The anthropology of “nesamosvojnost”
Good people make good politics. What is a good
man like, according to Comenius? His anthropology is extremely rich and dynamic. In view of the
theme of this paper, I want to focus on just one
aspect of his concept of mankind. It is one of the
key themes in Comenius’ anthropology, which in
a fundamental way determines not only ethics and
politics but also pedagogy and virtually every dimension of “human affairs.” It’s the understanding
of humankind as being neither self-originating nor

self-sustaining. Comenius’ first explicit discussion
of this theme is in Hlubina bezpečnosti (Centrum Securitatis), that is, in a work which dates back to his
pre-didactic and pre-pansophic period, early 1620s.
The Czech word for this—nesamosvojnost— is a
somewhat older term, but with very deep substance.
Inspired by Nicholas Cusanus, Comenius develops
the idea of the world as a wheel that, if it is to spin
properly, must be well-anchored at its center, which
is God the Creator. All the problems of humans and
their world are, according to Comenius, the result
of the dislocation of the wheel from its center, by
which that safe center of being is lost. In order to
best convey the lostness of the human position, Comenius introduces this particular notion of “samosvojnost” (self-originating-and-sustaining). He defines it as the situation of mankind having become
“fed up with God’s order of things” and “wanting to
each be their own being, which is to say their own
order, leader, guardian, lord—in sum, their own
god” (1927, 36). And this attitude then alienates
people not only from their Creator but also from
each other, for it causes them “to make themselves
their own goal, to love only themselves, to desire
only themselves, to care only for themselves” (1927,
36).10 They forget that it is from God that their
life—and even their own breath—flow, and rather
attribute everything to their own doing, or blind
luck. And this is, according to Comenius, the universal human condition: “Surely not even one who
is wholly in God and in whose heart is God’s will,
could resist the temptation of self-determination
(svojnosti) and self-alienation (jinudosti): we are all
too self-absorbed, one more in one way, another
more in another way; we all take care of ourselves
more than is necessary; we all listen to ourselves, or
even a stranger, more than we need to; and we all
like doing this more than we should” (1927, 4950). Thus the concept of non/samosvojnost has its
teleological and existential dimension. Teleologically those who have the concept of themselves as
non-self-origination-and-sustaining don’t consider
themselves to be the final goal of their own life.
Existentially, they know that they don’t belong to
themselves but are totally dependent on their Creator. The teleological and existential deformation of
human beings has as its consequence every human
“confusion” and “perplexity.” We experience these
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in the world, and the worse they are, the greater
their centrifugal force. In this stage of Comenius’s
development of thought, he sees only one medicine
against this human “wretchedness”: “... a return to
the center, which is God” (1927, 51).
This fundamental movement, which makes
sense of human life, is, in principle, very close to
the “return to the paradise of the heart” of the later
work called Labyrinth of the World and Paradise of
the Heart. Comenius called it resignatio in Centrum.
But it’s not about resignation in the modern sense
of the word—like something negative, hopeless and
unwanted—but exactly the opposite. It’s when one
looks at his futile efforts, stops seeking and groping
his way along at that point where nothing is, and
with hope turns his life towards that moment that
gives his life meaning, peace, and safety in the midst
of every hardship. It’s about a “resignation from
worldliness as it’s expressed in the given conditions
of the time,” as R. Palouš aptly put it.11 In other
words, it’s about resigning from dependency on
things that are earthly, changeable, and temporal.
In the 1630s, when Comenius begins to think
more didactically and eventually emendationally, he
realizes that the desired state requires action as well
as contemplation. For a person, to be “alright” isn’t
a given. The Czech word means to be “in order,”
that is, to have one’s own agenda fall in line with
that of the whole world, while also participating in
the happenings of the world and its organization.
Human beings are the co-rule-makers, the co-creators of the rules: mundus artificalis, mundus moralis, mundus spiritualis, and so on. By this work they
fulfill their mission or calling: putting the world
to rights—every human disfigurement, perplexity,
confusion, and disorder.12
The theme of overcoming human samosvojnost
is also apparent in Comenius’ education, which is
one of the principal tools of all remedial efforts. As
early as the introductory chapters in his Didactics,
Comenius identifies that the purpose of his educational efforts is the renewal of the “nexus hypostaticus,” that is, the relationship of human beings
to their Creator—which is precisely what breaks
samosvojnost.13 Overcoming samosvojnost is thus the
equivalent of that effort which keeps “one from becoming inhuman,” as Comenius clarifies in his later
Pampaedia.14
10
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Moral education has a special place in Comenius’s philosophy of education. I will briefly sketch
it out because morality is directly related to the
theme of this essay, and moreover, Comenius himself considers it the key chapter of his pedagogy,
as we will see. Morality as such is dealt with in his
Mundus moralis—6th grade of Pansofia (Comenius
1992), and partial notes can be found in many of
his works (School of infancy, Via lucis, etc.), but the
educational aspects of morality are most thoroughly treated in his Didactics (both Great and Czech,
briefly also in Analytical didactic). In addition to
little notes spread throughout the books, Comenius
devoted an entire chapter (XXIII in both books) to
the question and named it “Methodus morum in specie,” which M. W. Keating translates into English as
“The method of morals.“15
He begins the preface to this chapter by explaining that everything he had written to that point was
only the “preparation“ or “beginning“ and not the
main work. And it’s necessary to emphasize here
that in the previous twenty-two chapters he dealt
with nothing less than the entire system of pedagogical goals, principles, and methodology for the
teaching of “science, art and language.” But the
main work, according to Comenius, is the “study
of wisdom, which elevates us and makes us steadfast and noble-minded—the study to which we
have given the name of morality and of piety, and
by means by which we are exalted above all creatures, and draw nigh to God himself.” These three
purposes of the study of wisdom correspond to the
triad of fundamental pedagogical goals the author
introduced at the very beginning of his Didactic.
There in the introduction Comenius clarifies that
the teleological demand for knowledge, morals, and
godliness arises from an a priori anthropological nature, which means that to humankind it has been
given (1) to be knowledgeable of things, (2) to have
power over things and himself, and (3) to turn to
God, the source of everything.16
All three areas belong inseparably together and
would be “unhallowed” if they were separated.17
“For what is literary skill without virtue?” Comenius floats this rhetorical question and immediately
answers it with a reference to the old proverb “He
who makes progress in knowledge but not in morality ... retreats rather than advances. And thus what

Solomon said about the beautiful but foolish woman holds good for the learned man who possesses
no virtue: As a jewel of gold in a swine’s snout, so is
a fair woman who is without discretion” (Comenius
1926, X: 17). Hence an education that wasn’t held
together with morality and the “firm bond” of piety
would be a “miserable” education. A good education would instead develop humanity in all three
of the above-mentioned dimensions. For “the whole
excellence (essence in Czech didactics) of man,” Comenius explains elsewhere (Comenius 1905, IV: 7),
is situated in these three things, “for they alone are
the foundation of the present and of the future life.
All other things (health, strength, beauty, riches,
honour, friendship, good-fortune, long life) are as
nothing, if God grant them to any, but extrinsic ornaments of life, and if a man greedily gapes after
them, engrosses himself in their pursuit, occupies
and overwhelms himself with them to the neglect
of those more important matters, then they become
’superfluous vanities and harmful obstructions.’”
The proper aims of moral education in Comenius’s Didactic are the so-called “key” or cardinal virtues of “wisdom, moderation, courage and justice”
(prudentia, temperantia, fortitudo, iustitia), without
which the structure of pedagogy would be “unfounded.” Comenius first briefly clarifies the individual virtue and subsequently posits the method of
its acquisition; together, these then form the crux of
his methodology of character formation. He identifies six principles in Czech Didactic, and later in the
Great Didactic he supplements and expands them to
ten.18 For the sake of clarity I will only briefly summarize them here:
I.

II.

III.

Virtue is cultivated by actions, not by talk. For
man is given life “to spend it in communication with people and in action.” Without virtuous actions man isn’t anything more than a
meaningless burden on the earth.
Virtue is in part gained by interactions with
virtuous people. An example is the education
Alexander received from Aristotle.
Virtuous conduct is cultivated by active perseverance. A properly gentle and constant
occupation of the spirit and body turns into
diligence, so that idleness becomes unbearable
for such a man.

IV.

V.

VI.

At the heart of every virtue is service to others.
Inherent in fallen human nature is enormous
self-love, which has the effect that “everyone
wants most of the attention.” Thus it is necessary to carefully instill the understanding that
“we are not born only for ourselves, but for
God and our neighbor.”
Cultivation of the virtues must begin at the
earliest age, before “ill manners and vice begin
to nest.” In the same way that it’s easy to mold
wax and gypsum when they’re soft, but once
they’ve hardened it’s impossible to re-shape
them, so also with men: most of one’s character is based on the first “skills” that are instilled
in early childhood.
Honor is learned by virtuous action. As he
learns to “walk by walking, to speak by speaking, to read by reading” etc., so a man learns
“to obey by obedience, forbearance by delays,
veracity by speaking truth” and so on.

Overcoming samosvojnost
is thus the equivalent of
that effort which keeps “one
from becoming inhuman,” as
Comenius clarifies in his later
Pampaedia.
VII.

Virtue is learned by example. “For children
are like monkeys: everything they see, whether
good or bad, they immediately want to imitate, even when they’re told not to, and thus
they learn to imitate before they learn how to
learn.” Therefore they need “living examples”
as instructors.
VIII. Virtue is also learned by instruction, which
has to accompany example. Instructing means
clarifying the meaning of the given rule of
moral behavior, so as to understand why they
should do it, what they should do, and why
they should do it that way. Similarly, as “by a
thorn a beast is pushed to move or to run, so a
successful mind is not only told but also urged
by gentle words to run to virtue.“
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IX.

X.

It’s necessary to protect children from bad
people and influences. Inasmuch as a child’s
mind is easily infected, it is necessary on the
one hand to retreat from “evil society” and on
the other hand to avoid lazy people. For the
man who is idle “learns to do evil, because a
mind cannot be empty[;] if it isn’t carrying
something useful, it fills itself with empty, useless and vile things.”
Virtue requires discipline. Inasmuch as fallen
human nature reveals itself to be constantly
“here and there,” it’s necessary to systematically discipline it.19

It is worth mentioning that Comenius is aware
of the principle that a young age is well fitting for
any kind of education or formation. In chapter VII,
paragraph 4, he speaks almost like a developmental psychologist: “It is the nature of everything that
comes into being, that while tender, it is easily bent
and formed (emphasis mine) … . It is evident that
the same holds good with man himself,” continues
Comenius in the following paragraph, and he infers: “If piety is to take root in any man’s heart, it
must be engrafted while he is still young; if we wish
anyone to be virtuous, we must train (chisel, otesat
in Czech Didactics) him in early youth; if we wish
him to make great progress in wisdom, we must direct his faculties towards it in infancy… .”
A closer inspection of his various principles reveals an impressive array of pedagogical, psychological, and sociological intuition – as we have become
accustomed to with Comenius. It’s fascinating that
long before the possibility of experimental verification of his principles existed, Comenius saw and
named such patterns inherent in moral education
as the following: learning through practice, the influence of peer pressure, the principle of active participation, the principle of systematics, the principle
of appropriateness, the principle of imitation, the
significance of moral examples, and so on. Despite
his archaic language, Comenius again and again
amazes us with his timelessness and, as it were, “astonishingly prophetic” foresight, in the words of
Jean Piaget.20
Of all the principals mentioned above, I would
like to emphasize just one, and that is the one Comenius himself emphasizes as the key to the “bliss12
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ful state of private and public affairs” and which, by
its very nature, creates the core of all morality. It’s
the fourth principal. Comenius presents it by way
of an anthropological explanation: Human nature
is “spoiled,” suffering from the “loathsome vice” of
self-love, which manifests itself in such a way that
“everyone desires that care be devoted practically
only to themselves ...[;] everyone cares only about
his own things” and cares nothing about others or
the common good. The medicine that Comenius
prescribes for this disease of humanity is identical
with the previously mentioned principal of nesamosvojnost. Young people should be carefully taught
that “we are not born into this world only for ourselves, but for God and our neighbor, that is to say
for human race. Thus they will become seriously
persuaded of this truth, and will learn from their
childhood to imitate God” as does the whole of creation, which from its foundation exists not only for
itself but for others.
Conclusion
Comenius’s anthropology is at first glance subordinate to radically different assumptions and instances than those of today. His theology is alien to
contemporary readers, his metaphysics is static, and
his terminology is archaic. For questions of morality
in political practice, however, his anthropology offers surprising potential.
The human tendency towards samosvojnost is
revealed to be harmful, depraved, and immoral because humans weren’t created for themselves and
don’t belong only to themselves. The more one is
occupied with oneself, the less human one becomes;
the more one wants to belong only to oneself, the
more of oneself one loses. On the other hand, those
who manage to forget or lose themselves discover
their true humanity. Such is the order of creation.
Human beings aren’t and shouldn’t be the measure of their own things, let alone the measure of
all things, as the modern slogan homo mensura says.
Comenius’ education (and later emendation) aims
at putting human beings back in order (ordo). The
purpose of all education and emendation is to lead
humans up out of the harmful inclination towards
self and away from disorder. Of course it is a difficult process, even life-long,21 but necessary. If one is
not only to know what is good but also to do good

and to want the good, and to do that even when
nobody is watching, it has to be a lifelong journey
towards order – that is, putting one’s humanity in
order, in right relationship to oneself, to others, and
to the pre-ordained instance, which transcends everyone.22 I believe that only in this way is a person,
according to Comenius, qualified for political work
—in his day as well as the present.
Endnotes
1. This quotation comes from Comenius’ (Komensky’s)
Mundus moralis III (2), iv, which is part of the
General Consultation concerning Restoration of
Human Affairs (Komenský 1992).
2. Jan Amos Comenius (John Amos Komensky)
was a Czech (Moravian) 17th-century Brethren
bishop, philosopher, and educator who is celebrated
especially for his timeless didactic principles, which
earned him the epithet “the teacher of nations.” For
more details on Comenius see, for example, Hábl
2015.
3. For further discussion of Comenius’s anthropology,
see Hábl 2011 or Hábl 2010.
4. Panegersia (Awakening) is the introductory book
opening Comenius’ magnum opus Obecná porada
o nápravě věcí lidských [General Consultation
Concerning the Restoration of Human Affairs].
5. It is to all those “politicians” that the introductory
proclamations are addressed in Comenius’ magnum
opus Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských [General
Consultation Concerning the Restoration of Human
Affairs]. See the publication from the year 1992,
225.
6. Jan Sokol and Zdeněk Pinc, Anthropologic a Etica.
(Anthropology and Ethics). (Tritan, 2003), 8.
7. See for example Fobel 2002, Rich 1994, Jonas 1997,
Honneth 1996, and Furger 1996.
8. Compare Kohák 1993 and Kreeft 1990.
9. Giles Lipovetsky, Soumrak Povinnosti (Praha:
Proster, 1999), 11.
10. Compare also Kožmín and Kožmínová 2007, 60.
11. Radim Palouš, Komenskeho bozsi svet (Comenius’
God’s World) (Praha, 1992), 10.
12. Compare Palouš 1992, 75.
13. Human beings are the strangest creatures of all
because only in them do “heaven and earth, the
seen and the unseen, and death and immortality
converge, so that a rational, immortal, eternal soul

dwells in a piece of clay, which is a great sign of the
Creator’s wisdom ...” (Czech Didactic I, 3). Only
with human beings does God cultivate a personal
relationship (nexus hypostaticus) and thus joins His
nature with human nature (Great Didactic I, 3).
14. Comenius repeated this idea many times in different
places. See for example Pampaedia, II:8.
15. In most citations I will rely on Keating’s translation;
my own translations from Czech Didactic will be
indicated. Most of the citations I will make in this
paper come from this 23rd chapter; therefore I won’t
burden the reader with excessive references. I will
only cite the reference when it comes from a different
chapter in Didactic or from a different book.
16. Comenius (1926) submitted his pedagogical
teleology in the 4th chapter.
17. Comenius (1905, ch. X) clarifies the theme of the
inseparability of the individual areas of education
in another chapter, explaining the so-called
“universality” of education.
18. There is a question as to whether the expanded
version in the Great Didactics is actually clearer. The
careful reader can’t escape the fact that some of the
principles in the “great” version overlap each other.
19. Comenius presents a more detailed analysis of the
method of discipline in chapter XXVI.
20. Jean Piaget, “Jan Amos Comenius,” Prospects
(UNESCO, International Bureau of Education
XXIII [1/2], 1993), 9.
21. Comenius realized the need for lifelong formation of
humanity only in the emendation phase of his work,
as seen for example in Pampaedia, where, unlike in
the Didactics, he supplements individual “schools”
with “the school of adulthood, the school of old-age
and the school of death,” because in the General
Meeting he already knew that “all life is a school”
(see Pampaedia, XIII 1).
22. On the issue of pre-ordination and subordination
see Palouš 1991.
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